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Abstract— Now-a-days, more and more information systems are linked to the Internet and offer Web interfaces
to the general public or to a limited set of users. This paper proposes a standard manner to implement
interruption-lenient Web servers. This manner is based on idleness and diversification principles in order to
increase the system resilience to assaults: usually, an assault targets particular software, running on a particular
platform, and fails on others. The manner is composed of redundant proxies that mediate client requests to a
redundant bank of diversified application servers. The idleness is deployed here to increase system availability
and integrity. To improve presentation, adaptive idleness is applied: the idleness level is selected according to
the current attentive level. The manner can be used for static servers, that is, for Web distribution of stable
information (updated offline) and for fully dynamic systems where information updates are executed
immediately on an online database. The feasibility of this manner has been demonstrated by implementing an
example of a travel agency Web server, and the first presentation tests are satisfactory, both for request
execution times and recovery after incidents.
Keywords- COTS (commercial off-the-shelf), reliability, protection, interruption - lenient, survivability.

I. INTRODUCTION
Everybody agrees now that the Internet has
become essential in everyday life. People use the
Internet to work, to exchange information, to make
purchases, etc. This growth of the Internet use has
unfortunately been accompanied by a growth of
malicious activity in the Internet. More and more
vulnerabilities are discovered, and nearly every day,
new protection advisories are published. Potential
assaulters are very numerous, even if they represent
only a very small proportion among the hundreds of
millions of Internet users. The problem is thus
particularly tricky: on one hand, the development of
the Internet allows complex and sophisticated
services to be offered, and on the other hand, these
services offer to the assaulter many new weaknesses
and vulnerabilities to exploit.
Almost all traditional approaches for building
secure systems only focus on preventing assaults to
be successful. Such approaches are becoming
insufficient when used in the context of open
networks like the Internet, which are characterized by
frequent appearance of new assaults. Current systems
are so complex that it is impossible to identify and
correct all their vulnerabilities before they are put in
operation. Thus, preventive approaches require
regular updates of some components of the system as
soon as a new vulnerability is discovered, that is,
nearly every day. Consequently, keeping the system

defenses up to date is becoming a full-time task.
Furthermore, protection updates of some components
may lead to degradations of the service that they
provide due to incompatibility with previous versions
or reduction in functionality. It is clear that the
preventive approaches are not sufficient: it is
necessary to build systems that survive assaults,
because it is not possible to stop them all.
For that purpose, we propose in this paper a
standard manner for interruption-lenient Web servers.
We address, in particular, servers publishing
information that is not confidential (that is, public
access Web servers) but whose integrity and
availability are critical. No particular assumption is
made regarding the software run by the Web servers:
they are commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software,
that is, components that are likely to have
vulnerabilities. To make the server interruption
lenient, we propose to use diversification in idleness.
By diversification, we mean that the redundant
components will be implemented with as much
diversity as possible. We use these techniques to give
the system the possibility of continuing its mission,
even if some of its components are compromised.
Therefore, while the corrupted components are
repaired, the legitimate users continue receiving a
correct service, even during assaults. We argue that
diversification is very important, because assaults, in
general, take advantage of specific vulnerabilities
either in the operating system (OS) or in the
application software. We assume that any

International Journal of Computer Science and Informatics ISSN (PRINT): 2231 –5292, Volume-2, Issue-3, 2012

International Journal of Computer Science and Informatics ISSN (PRINT): 2231 –5292, Volume-3, Issue-3
91
179

Conation of a Standard Interruption-Lenient Manner for Web Servers

vulnerability affects particular software on a
particular platform, and consequently, an assault
exploiting vulnerability is dedicated to one platform
and will be inefficient on the others: a buffer
overflow exploit for PowerPC Linux will be
ineffective on Windows XP running on x86. The
servers that we consider are dedicated to the Web and
provide no other service, so the only assaulters to
consider are Web clients (connected through regular
http requests) and server administrators. All other
remote accesses are blocked by a firewall or are
rejected by the servers.
The manner can be used for 1) fully static servers
such as the Web distribution of static content that
provide stable information, which can be updated
offline, for example, a server publishing protection
attentive, like www.cert.org, and 2) fully dynamic
systems where the updates are executed immediately
on an online database (for example, the Web Server
of an Internet-based travel agency, where bookings,
modifications, and cancellations are made in real
time). Our manner is not conational for some specific
Web applications such as search engines or auction
servers that use farms of thousands of servers. To
achieve such a high scalability, specific interruptionlenient techniques, dedicated to the targeted
application, must be implemented, while our manner
aims at being standard for large classes of Web server
applications.
The main contributions of this manner are the
following:
The systematic use of diversification
(hardware, OS, and application software),
The notion of adaptive idleness according to
the attentive level (particular attention was
paid to efficiency by means of a lowoverhead idleness/voting mechanism),
The
specific
choice
of
multiple
complementary detection mechanisms (these
detection mechanisms, taken together,
constitute a whole interruption detection
system (IDS) much more powerful that
traditional IDSs), and
The realization of an interruption-lenient
dynamic Web server using a database server
that only tolerates accidental foibles.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows: In Section 2, the concepts of foible and
interruption tolerance are defined. Then, related work
in the fields of interruption tolerance and survivable
systems is given in Section 3. In Section 4, a standard
interruption-lenient manner for Web servers is
proposed. In Section 5, we present some presentation
test results from this prototype. Section 6 concludes
and presents future work.
II. PRINCIPLES OF INTERRUPTION
LENIENCE

A dependable system [1] is defined as one that is
able to deliver a service that can justifiably be trusted.
Attributes of dependability include availability
(readiness for correct service), reliability (continuity
of correct service), confidentiality (prevention of
unauthorized disclosure of information), and integrity
(the absence of improper system state alterations).
Protection is the concurrent existence of 1)
availability for authorized users only, 2)
confidentiality, and 3) integrity, with ―improper‖
taken as meaning ―malicious‖ rather than accidental.
Foible-lenient techniques can be used to build
dependable systems that are interruption lenient [10],
that is, able to continue providing a secure service,
despite the presence of malicious foibles, that is,
deliberate assaults on the protection of the system.
Such foibles are perpetrated by assaulters who make
unauthorized attempts to access, modify, or destroy
information in a system and/or to render the system
unreliable or unusable. Assaults are facilitated by
vulnerabilities, which are foibles in the requirements,
specification, conation, implementation, and/or
configuration of a system.
Assaults, vulnerabilities, and interruptions are defined
as three types of interrelated foibles:
Assault: This is a malicious interaction
foible through which an assaulter aims at
deliberately violating one or more protection
properties or an interruption attempt.
Vulnerability: This is a foible created
during the development of the system or
during operation, which could be exploited
to create an interruption.
Interruption: This is a malicious externally
induced foible resulting from an assault that
has been successful in exploiting
vulnerability.

Fig 1: Foible Tolerance Mechanism

An interruption-lenient system is a system that is
capable of self diagnosis, repair, and reconfiguration
while continuing to provide a correct service to
legitimate users in the presence of interruptions [4].
Such a system must be able to identify a wrong
―state‖ or a wrong behavior to recover this situation
and to avoid that an internal failure propagates to a
system failure observed by the clients.
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The mechanisms that can be used to make a system
interruption lenient are directly inherited from the
usual foible lenient mechanisms:
error detection techniques,
error handling techniques to avoid errors
from propagating into a protection failure
observed by the users
Foible handling techniques to eliminate the
causes of the detected errors.
These mechanisms are represented in Fig. 1 in the
context of an interruption-lenient system.

Assaults can be performed by clients or
administrators. Administrators are local
privileged users. The servers are in different
administrative domains so that it is not
possible for a single administrator to control
or corrupt all the servers. Clients are remote
users that access the Web servers by sending
them http requests. Some authenticated
clients may have more privileges to perform
updates or access restricted data. For that,
conventional
authentication
and
authorization mechanisms (including the
https protocol) can be implemented, but this
is beyond the scope of this paper.
To face such assaults, each Web server and proxy
must be administrated by a different person in such a
way that a malicious administrator can successfully
assault the server that he administrates but not the
other ones. As his local administrator privileges do
not give him any particular privilege on the other
Web servers and proxies, he cannot corrupt them. The
corruption of the whole system would require the
malicious cooperation of most administrators, which
is very unlikely.

III. AN INTERRUPTION-LENIENT WEB
SERVER
This section presents in detail the manner of our
interruption-lenient Web Server. This section begins
with the foible model and threat assumptions and
ends with a protection analysis of the whole manner.
3.1 Foible Model and Omen Assumptions
The manner aims at tolerating both accidental
foibles and deliberate foibles. In particular, we
consider the following foible classes:

Assaults from clients can be performed only
by sending http requests. All other requests
can be filtered out by the firewall, and they
would be rejected by the servers. So, http
requests are the only way for a client to
communicate with our system. Denial-ofservice assaults by flooding the network
with requests are not explicitly addressed by
our manner: we consider that this problem
must be treated by the network.
Nevertheless, we can consider that the
firewall can also identify such assaults and
filter out the flooding requests so that they
do not affect our system directly.
The probability distribution of the assaults is
not uniform, and assaults are usually much
correlated events: an assault generally does
not occur alone, and many assault attempts
may occur in short time intervals. It is thus
advisable to increase the tolerance capacity
when an assault is detected so as to better
tolerate an expected burst of assaults.

Temporary foibles (hardware or software).
These can be removed by restarting the
corrupted machine. For example, corrupted
tables or programs will be reinitiated from
clean copies at reboot.
Permanent conation foibles (hardware or
software). These can be tolerated through
software and hardware diversification, for
example, bugs or hardware manufacturing
defects. Such foibles are activated each time
the system reaches a particular state that
triggers them. If such activation is
sufficiently rare, it can be sufficient to restart
the failing component. If the activation
frequency becomes unacceptable, the
component (hardware or software) must be
repaired by patches or by replacement with a
new version.
Deliberate human-made foibles. These can
be malicious or resulting from an
engineering decision and can be tolerated,
thanks to diversification.

3.2 Web Servers: Idleness and Diversification
Next, we present the assumptions underlying the
conation of the manner:
The firewall cannot stop all the assaults, but
an assaulter has no means of modifying the
firewall configuration.
At any given moment, all the correct servers
return the same correct answers1 to the same
request. The consistency of the manner
depends on this property and the
determinism of execution.

The manner is based on the principles of idleness
and diversification. Idleness is used to increase
system availability, and diversification is used to
increase independence between redundant subsystems
from the assaulter’s point of view. Since most
assaults take advantage of specific vulnerabilities in a
particular OS, application software, or hardware
platform, they are, in general, ineffective on others.
So, the deployment of a redundant bank of diversified
Web servers (hardware/OS/software diversification

International Journal of Computer Science and Informatics ISSN (PRINT): 2231 –5292, Volume-2, Issue-3, 2012

International Journal of Computer Science and Informatics ISSN (PRINT): 2231 –5292, Volume-3, Issue-3
93

181

Conation of a Standard Interruption-Lenient Manner for Web Servers

level) should allow the system to continue providing
acceptable service to users, even if parts of the system
are corrupted. The Web servers provide the same
services (that is, they typically return exactly the
same html pages) but are running different
application software (Apache or IIS) and OSs
(Solaris, Linux, Windows 2000, or MacOS) on
diverse hardware platforms (SPARC, Pentium, or
PowerPC). They include IDS monitors but are
otherwise ordinary platforms running diverse COTS
software.
3.3 Adaptive Idleness point
In order to minimize the presentation degradation
of the system, the notion of adapted idleness is
introduced. The rule is the number of Web servers
that process each client request. If the manner
includes N Web servers and if the rule is n, it means
that only n among N servers process the request. The
rule n is selected according to the assault density.
When the system is under an active assault, the rule is
increased automatically to improve the interruption
tolerance capacity. This allows a graceful degradation
of presentation in order to reinforce the robustness of
the system. The rule will be decreased if a time-out
expires without any anomaly being detected.
Consequently, the number N of Web servers has to be
selected so that a sufficient presentation is provided
for an expected assault rate, corresponding to a
nominal rule. Typically, the nominal rule can be 1
(simplex) for noncritical applications or 2 (duplex) or
3 (triplex) for more critical applications (see Fig. 2
for duplex and triplex rules).

servers 1 and 3, and the second is executed by servers
2 and 3. At the end of these requests, the four
databases are inconsistent. This is a quite simple
scenario: more complex situations can be easily
imagined. A simple solution to this problem is to
reject all update requests. In that case, the information
stored in the Web servers can only be modified
offline once a day, for example, on all the servers and
to switch all the servers at the same time between the
two versions of the data. This is acceptable for static
content Web servers such as protection attentive
repositories.
However, if we consider the example of a travel
agency Web server, the data managed by such a
server must be updated in real time (for booking,
modification, and cancellation). The Web servers
must thus be able to access and update a database in
real time. If each Web server uses its own database,
the atomicity and consistency problems remain. Thus,
to authorize online updates in a safe functioning rule,
we have decided that only the rarely updated data are
to be kept replicated on each Web server. The data
that are likely to be frequently modified are stored on
a centralized foible-lenient database server.

Fig 3: An intrusion tolerant architecture for Web Servers

Fig 2: Duplex and Triplex Rules

3.4 Active Data Management
Since requests are not processed by all Web
servers (except in the full N rule), an update request
cannot modify consistently all the Web servers. If a
request updates some data on one server, the same
modification should be applied on the other servers in
a consistent and atomic way. Let us consider the
following example: The system is composed of four
Web servers and applies the duplex rule. Two update
requests are accepted: the first one is executed by

By ―foible lenient,‖ we mean that the database
server is sufficiently internally redundant so that it
tolerates foibles and thus ensures that the database
queries that it receives are always correctly executed.
It can integrate replicated databases or use any other
usual foible-lenient technique. Such foible-lenient
database servers are commercially available from
major vendors. The main problem is then to protect
the database in such a way that no illegal database
query, requested by a corrupted Web server, is
executed. Our solution is based on the use of a
particular proxy, the adjudicator.
3.5 Proxies
To manage idleness and make it transparent to the
clients, tolerance proxies are included in our manner,
as depicted in Fig. 3. These proxies have an essential
function in the interruption tolerance policy (ITP).
They mediate client requests, monitor the state of the
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Web servers and the other proxies, dynamically select
the rule according to the attentive level, and protect
the database. These proxies are also diversified
(diverse OSs and diverse platforms are used). The
software that they run is not diversified, but it is a
very simple code, formally verified offline (during
development) and checked online (by runtime
verifiers). Furthermore, the proxies are hardened by
turning off all the nonessential services of their OSs.
The kernels of these OS are particularly secured (by
integrating a Pax or grprotection patch [8] for a
Linux kernel for example). The communication
protocols between proxies are very simple and static
(the format of all messages is always the same). The
leader impersonates all the Web servers from the
client point of view. The IP address of the leader IPL
is the only public IP address, and it is considered as
―the‖ IP address of the virtual Web server. The leader
is also responsible for balancing the load among the
Web servers.
The leader receives the replies from the Web
servers and, according to an agreement protocol (AP),
decides the response to return to the client. If the
responses are not consistent, an alarm is raised by the
leader. Each proxy (leader or other) monitors the
other proxies and the Web servers by means of
various detection mechanisms described. The proxies
decide and apply together the tolerance policy in
response to the alarms. The proxies analyze the
alarms and take adequate decisions about the
tolerance policy according to the attentive level.
Responses to interruptions include enforcing a more
stringent rule, filtering out requests from suspicious
clients, and restarting servers and proxies that are
suspected of being corrupted. If the leader is declared
corrupted, then a protocol is executed by the other
proxies to elect a new leader (automatic proxy
reconfiguration). The IP address of this new leader
changes to IPL.
One other proxy is elected to become the
adjudicator. The adjudicator is in charge of
controlling all accesses to the database server. In fact,
it coordinates, checks, and filters the database queries
received from the Web servers.

Fig 4: Proxy Architecture

The role of the proxy may be as the leader, the
adjudicator, or the auxiliary. There is no specific
module for the auxiliary role. In that case, the proxy
only executes the attentive supervisor function; that
is, it permanently checks and evaluates locally the
states of the other proxies and servers and stores its
evaluation of these states (trustworthy, suspected, or
corrupted; see Fig. 6).
The attentive supervisor includes one monitor for
each detection mechanism included in the manner
and several other functions: an AP function, an ITP
supervisor function, an executor function, and a rolechanging function. The main role of the attentive
supervisor is to process the attentive raised by the
diversified detection mechanisms according to their
credibility.
As shown in Fig. 5, each monitor waits for
messages from the corresponding attentive source or
from the same monitors on the other proxies. For
example, the SNORT monitor is waiting for ―SNORT
attentive,‖ the ―AP monitor‖ is waiting for AP
attentive, etc. When one of these monitors receives an
attentive, it verifies the local current state of the
suspected components. If it is already considered as
corrupted, the attentive is ignored. If it is considered
as trustworthy, then the attentive is broadcast to the
same monitors on the others proxies, and a request is
sent to the AP function to start a vote among all the
proxies about this component.

3.6 Attentive Supervisor
Fig. 4 illustrates the proxy manner, which is
composed of a specific module, depending on the
proxy role and the attentive supervisor that is
common to all proxies.

Fig 5: Different steps of attentive processing

The AP function is responsible for carrying out
votes between all the proxies in order to find a
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common decision about a suspected component. If a
majority agrees on the corruption of a component, a
request is sent to the ITP supervisor to generate the
list of countermeasures adequate to the corrupted
component’s role. This list is generated by the proxy
that initiated the vote and is broadcast to all the
proxies.
The executor module is responsible for executing
the countermeasures list. For example, if the
corrupted component is the leader, the role-changing
function will configure the new leader to be able to
execute its new functionalities.
As shown in Fig. 6, the state of a component X
can be TRUSTWORTHY, SUSPECTED, or
CORRUPTED. When a monitor receives an attentive
from the corresponding error detection mechanism, it
can process or ignore this attentive according to two
parameters: the current component state and the
importance (weight) of the new attentive. Fig. 6
describes the evolution of the state according to the
received attentive.

Fig 6: Different States of Component X

The weights assigned to the different attentive
raised in the system should be evaluated by an
experimental study and according to the credibility of
each error detection mechanism.
We do not address this problem in this paper.
3.7 Protection Study
Let us summarize the protection features of our
manner. It includes mechanisms for preventing,
detecting, and tolerating interruptions. To prevent
interruptions, 1) suspicious http and SQL requests are
filtered out and sanitized (by the leader, the
adjudicator, and the mediator), 2) a trusted firewall
blocks all connections from the outside, except http
requests to the leader, and 3) the OS of the proxies is
particularly hardened.
To detect interruptions
1. Both proxies and Web servers include HIDS
sensors,

2. The traffic on the internal network connecting
proxies and Web servers is monitored by a NIDS,
3. The IDSs are very efficient, because the messages
allowed on the Web servers network are limited to
http or SQL requests and to monitoring service
messages,
4. The CRP is run periodically by the proxies to
check the integrity of critical processes and files,
5. The proxies execute runtime verifiers based on
formal specifications [11], and
6. An AP is used to validate the server responses.
To tolerate interruptions, 1) the principle of
diversification in idleness is applied so that a majority
of components continues to provide a correct service
to clients, even if a minority of components is
corrupted, 2) the notion of adaptative idleness allows
the tolerance capacity to increase when the assault
density increases, and 3) any safe proxy can replace
the leader or the adjudicator if it is detected as being
corrupted, and any corrupted Web server or proxy
can be rebooted from a read-only, trusted media.
Now, let us take the point of view of an assaulter and
explain why it is very difficult for him to make the
whole system fail, even if he succeeds in corrupting a
component.
3.7.1 Administrator Assaults
As we assume that servers and proxies are in
different
administrative
domains
(that
is,
administrated by a different person), a malicious
administrator can successfully assault the server that
he administrates but not the other ones. As his local
administrator privileges do not give him any
particular privilege on the other Web servers and
proxies, he cannot corrupt them. The corruption of
the whole system would require the malicious
cooperation of most administrators, which is very
unlikely.
3.7.2 Client Assaults
A client is a remote user accessing the Web server by
sending http requests only. If such an intruder wants
to corrupt the system, the first step of the assault is to
select a target component (proxy, Web server, or
database server) and determine the vulnerabilities that
he will exploit.
If the assaulter targets a proxy, his task are
difficult, because the kernel of the proxies is
hardened, the nonessential OS services are turned off,
and the proxies execute runtime verifiers based on
formal specifications. The leader only receives http
requests and does not process them. It simply
analyzes the requests, filters out those detected as
suspicious, and forwards the others to the Web
servers. The adjudicator is not directly accessible
from the outside but only from the Web servers
(mediators) and the leader. Moreover, each proxy
monitors the behavior of the other ones and
periodically checks their integrity. As a consequence,
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―correct‖ majority of servers is unreasonable. The
assumption that an assault exploiting a specific
vulnerability can succeed on a particular platform
(hardware, OS, and application software) but fails on
others is clear for some vulnerabilities such as buffer
overflow. For other kinds of vulnerabilities, for
example, CGI assaults on Web servers, [7] report
several experiments and conclude in the same way.

any corrupted proxy can be rebooted, and a safe one
can replace it. Injections of false messages or
modifications of messages on the networks are
immediately detected by the network IDS.
If the assaulter targets the database server, it must
either launch its assault by sending a malicious SQL
request (through an http request) or by assaulting first
the adjudicator (see discussion above). An assault that
attempts to exploit specific SQL weaknesses [3]
could try to generate the same malicious SQL
requests on all the servers. To detect such assaults,
we have implemented in the mediator some request
filtering mechanisms that reject suspicious SQL
requests (SQL injections for example). The SQL
assaults based on stack buffer overflow like the
Slammer worm [2] also fail, because there is no way
of accessing the database server directly from the
outside.
To be successful on our manner, an assault should
be one of the following:
a ―silver bullet‖ (an assault that would be
successful on all the servers) that would stay
invisible enough to assault all the servers
without being detected (if the current rule is
the full rule, that assault would succeed
immediately, but for other rules, the assault
would have to evade detection by any of the
different detection mechanisms during
enough time for the assaulter to corrupt all
Web servers),
a massive and very fast assault that would
try to exploit vulnerabilities of all our
diversified servers (a lot of malicious
requests, each one trying to exploit a
vulnerability specific to a particular
platform: this assault would be detected but
would probably provoke a denial of service
of the whole system, because all the servers
would reboot nearly at the same moment)
An assault that would succeed in corrupting
the leader (changing its behavior) without
being detected by the other proxies or by the
runtime verifier.
Taking into account the mechanisms of our
manner, we consider these assaults as very difficult to
build and launch and, thus, as very unlikely.

IV. PRESENTATION DIMENSIONS
A prototype of the manner presented in this paper
has been implemented. The Web server implemented
as an example in the prototype is the Web server of a
travel agency. Hardware diversification was realized
with Pentium, PowerPC, and Sparc processors. In the
same way, diversified OS’s was used: Linux,
Windows XP, MacOSX, and Solaris. Three proxies,
three Web servers (two versions of Apache and IIS),
and one MySQL server were used.
4.1 Presentations According to the rule
To test the presentation of the prototype according
to the rule, identical client requests (without access to
the database) have been executed in a conventional
Web server and in the manner in simplex, duplex, and
triplex rules.
Processing an http request in the manner includes
the following steps:
1. The request is received by the leader.
2. The leader sends to the adjudicator the RID
and the servers that are chosen to execute the
request.
3. The leader sends the request to the mediators
associated with the chosen servers.
4. The leader receives the MD5 hash codes
from the servers and starts the API (the
servers do not send the whole response to
the leader but an MD5 hash code of the
response).
5. The leader sends a full response request to a
particular server among the majority.
6. The leader receives the full response and
recomposes the MD5 hash code.
TABLE 2
Relative Evolution of Global Processing Time
According to the Rule and Size of the File

TABLE 1
Global Processing Time According to the Rule and
Size of the File

In this experiment, the Global Processing Time
for an http request was measured: GPTHTTP = t7 -t1:

In [5], Chinchani et al. claim that using foiblelenient techniques to secure a system gives a false
sense of protection, because the assumption of a

4.2 Presentation of Database entrées
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In this section, the measure realized corresponds
to a request that needs an access to the database
server. The objective here is to evaluate the cost
induced by the operations executed by the
adjudicator. The test was realized in the duplex rule
with a PHP script that consists of the following
operations:
1. Connection to the database,
2. Sending ―select * from flights‖ request,
3. Receiving the 2-Kbit data response, and
4. Closing the connection to the database server.

of the AP on the responses. The GPTDB represents the
global processing time of the database request.
As shown in Table 3, the average GPTHTTP for this
experiment is 0.045 second, which represents twice
the GPTHTTP using a standard MySQL library (0.02
second). The latter case corresponds to a direct access
to the database without the adjudicator, mediator, and
AP. This result seems acceptable but could be
improved: during the development, we focused on
providing the essential functionalities and not on
improving the library presentation.
4.3 Presentation of Isolation and Reboot of a
Corrupted Server

This experiment includes the following steps:
1. The request is received by the leader.
2. The leader sends to the adjudicator the RID and the
servers that are chosen to execute the request.
3. The leader sends the request to the mediators
associated with the chosen servers.
4. The adjudicator receives the connection requests to
the database from the mediators, executes an AP, and
establishes the connection to the database. The
database response is returned to the mediators.
5. The adjudicator receives the selection requests to
the database from the mediators, executes an AP, and
transmits the request to the database. The database
response is returned to the mediators.
TABLE 3
Comparison of Duration Using Our Library and
MySQL Standard Library

6. The adjudicator receives the select requests to the
database from the mediators, executes an AP, and
transmits the request to the database. The database
response is returned to the mediators.
7. The adjudicator receives the disconnection requests
from the mediators, executes an AP, and transmits
the disconnection request to the database. The
database response is returned to the mediators.
8. The servers calculate their response, generate a
MD5 hash code on this response, and send it to the
leader.
9. The leader executes an AP on these hash codes and
then asks one proxy to send the whole response. It
then forwards this response to the client.
Table 3 summarizes the measures. The GPTHTTP is
the global processing time of the request. The APT
represents the time spent from the sending of the
requests by the leader to the mediators until the end

In this experiment, we focused on the attentive
reaction time in case of the corruption of one Web
server. We have considered a CRP attentive. The
experiment begins with the reception of the attentive
by one of the proxies and ends with the reboot of the
corrupted machine. The first proxy that receives the
attentive begins a vote among the proxies about the
suspected component.
This experiment includes the following steps:
1. A CRP monitor receives an attentive ―server S is
corrupted‖ and sends a vote request to the AP
module.
2. The vote finishes with a consensus on the
corruption of S.
3. The vote result is broadcast to all proxies.
4. The AP module sends a request to the ITP
supervisor to generate the list of countermeasures to
react to this interruption.
5. The countermeasures list is broadcast to all
proxies.
6. The Executor module sends to the specific module
the orders to isolate S and to change the current rule.
The Executor module also changes the CRP
frequency and sends a reboot order to the corrupted
machine.
7. The attentive supervisor receives the reboot
notification sent by S after its reboot.
V. RELATED WORK
Interruption tolerance is not a new concept. The
Delta-4 Project [9], [4] was one of the earliest works
on interruption tolerance, in contrast with the
traditional protection approaches aiming at avoiding
interruptions. It proposed an original approach for
protection in open distributed systems. One of the
interesting features of the Delta-4 manner is the
fragmentation scattering technique that has been
applied to file storage, protection management, and
data processing. For protection management, the
principle resides in the distribution of the
authentication and authorization functions between a
set of sites administered by different people so that
failure of a few sites or abuse of privilege by a small
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number of administrators do not endanger the
protection functions. Finally, for data processing, two
data kinds are considered: 1) numerical and logical
data, whose semantics are defined by the application,
and 2) contextual data (for example, character strings)
that is subjected only to simple operations (input,
display, concatenation, etc.). In this scheme,
contextual data is ciphered and deciphered only on a
user site during input and display.
Within OASIS, the first version of our
architecture was designed by SRI International and
LAAS-CNRS in the Dependable Intrusion Tolerance
(DIT) Project [13]. This version was developed for
servers with static content only. The architecture that
is proposed in this paper takes into account also the
dynamic content issue and the problems related to
online updating.
Among all the other projects included in the
OASIS Program, the SITAR Project has many
similarities with our work. The SITAR [12]
architecture addresses highly available distributed
applications. It is based on redundancy and
diversification, adaptive reconfiguration, and vote.
This architecture is composed of the following:

considered as ARMOR Supervisors, and our
mediator, proxy, and error detection mechanisms can
be considered as common ARMORs.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a standard interruption
lenient manner based on idleness and diversification.
The manner was conational to be standard, even if we
have focused in this paper on Web servers. The
proposed manner matches our original goals: 1) to
build secure systems using COTS components that
are likely to include vulnerabilities, 2) to achieve high
integrity and availability requirements, which are the
main needs of the critical systems targeted by our
manner, and 3) to find a good trade-off between
protection and presentation.
The manner is based on three levels of
diversification— software, OS, and hardware—so
that it would be difficult to corrupt a majority of the
servers.
The
diversification
increases
the
independence of the replicated servers: vulnerability
is specific to one server platform, and it is highly
unlikely that it will also affect the others. The
efficiency of interruption tolerance is strongly
dependent on the deployed detection mechanisms.
Our manner includes a set of diversified
complementary detection mechanisms: we deploy
HIDS and NIDS, a CRP to check the integrity of
remote machines, runtime verification techniques to
check the trustworthiness of the proxies, and an AP to
detect any corrupted behavior among a minority of
servers or proxies. We propose an attentive
supervisor to process and correlate the attentive
generated by these mechanisms. It implements the
ITP decided by the administrators, which stipulates
the countermeasures to be executed to face different
situations.
A thorough protection analysis has yielded a
qualitative evaluation of the deployed interruptionlenient mechanisms. It would be interesting to carry
out a quantitative and experimental study to evaluate
the robustness of our manner under ―real‖ assaults.
Moreover, we plan to make some measures to
evaluate the capacity of the manner to be deployed
for large-scale systems and to determine its limits
from both robustness and presentation points of view.

1. COTS servers,
2. Proxy servers
3. Acceptance monitors, in charge of
validating the responses from the COTS
servers
4. Ballot monitors, applying a chosen voting
mechanism to solve conflicts and deciding
the final response
5. An adaptive reconfiguration module, and
6. The audit control.
Chameleon [6] is an adaptive infrastructure that
allows different levels of availability requirements to
be simultaneously supported in a distributed system.
Chameleon provides dependability through the use of
Adaptive, Reconfigurable, and Mobile Objects for
Reliability (ARMORs) that control all operations in
the Chameleon environment. Employing ARMORs,
Chameleon
makes
different
foible-lenient
configurations available and maintains runtime
adaptation to changes in the availability requirements
of an application. ARMORs can be reconfigured in
order to provide an adaptive software infrastructure.
A prototype has been implemented, and the
experimental results show that overheads in
application execution and recovery times are
acceptable. The detection mechanisms rely on a local
observation of a node and not a global analysis of the
whole system behavior. The main similarity between
Chameleon and our work is that both manners can
adapt dynamically their level of idleness and, thus,
the foible tolerance capability, according to variations
of the runtime context. Moreover, some components
of our manner play a role similar to some Chameleon
components: our attentive supervisors can be
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